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Pictorial Narratives and Temporal Refinement
Tim Fernando
Trinity College Dublin
Abstract Refinements are proposed to the default reading of two successive pictures
p, p′ as p and then p′. The refinements are based on the Aristotelian dictum, no
time without change , and the principle of inertia, no change without force , guided
by the adage, a picture’s worth a thousand words. Words describing pictures are
formalized as predicates, some stative and some non-stative (expressing forces), and
interpreted (in either case) over strings qua models, subject to finite-state projections
supporting variable granularity. A form of string iconicity is explored, with an eye
to more transparent representations.
Keywords: pictorial narrative, temporal refinement, stative, force, string iconicity
1 Introduction
At the root of viewpoint-centered propositions in recent work on the semantics of
pictorial narratives (Abusch 2013, 2014; Abusch & Rooth 2017; Rooth & Abusch
2018; Maier & Bimpikou To appear: among others) is an understanding of pictures
in terms of projections (e.g., Hagen 1986). Stepping beyond any single picture
within a narrative, we may ask
(Q) Is there a projective account of temporal progression in pictorial narratives?
A positive answer to (Q) is presented below, in which a sequence p1p2 · · · pn of
pictures pi constituting a pictorial narrative is turned into a string of boxes not unlike
the Discourse Representation Structures of Kamp & Reyle (1993). The simple case
of representing p1p2 as (D) follows Dowty (1986)’s rule of temporal succession,
adopted by Abusch (2014) for a default reading specifying two stretches of time,
one with p1, followed by one with p2.
(D) p1 p2 (default progression: ‘p1 and then p2’)
Under an alternative reading (N), p1 and p2 describe one and the same stretch of
time — or one box.
(N) p1, p2 (no progression: ‘p1 and simultaneously p2’)
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The idea is that temporal boundaries are marked by boxes, each assumed to carve
out an interval of time, abutting intervals from adjacent boxes, arranged so that the
box to the left is earlier than that to the right. Now, if we assume that p1 and p2 are
stative, as Abusch (2014) does, then the inertiality of statives (Dowty 1986) suggests
that in the default reading (D), p1 persists forward to the next box, and p2 persists
backward to the previous box, unless a force intervenes. That is, in the absence of
an intervening force, inertia transforms (D) into (I).
(I) p1, p2 p1, p2 (inertia: stutter αα)
(I) consists of two temporal stretches, both featuring p1 and p2. As statives are
cumulative, we can merge these two stretches into one (effectively deleting a time
without change). Progression by default, (D), has turned into no progression, (N).
This is welcome only in cases where the default should be overriden (not where the
default applies). The moral, it would appear, is that if (D) and (N) are distinct, it is
because a barrier between p1 and p2 is erected by some force. But what force? Can
we make this reasoning rigorous, and develop it further? Or should we put (D), (N)
and (I) away, and not bother?
1.1 Iconicity, sequence, transformation and representation
The default reading (D) of p1p2, traced above to Dowty (1986), is widely associated
with iconicity, understood as resemblance between the form of a sign and its meaning.
“Iconicity of sequence” describes cases where “the sequence of forms conforms
to the sequence of experience” (Perniss & Vigliocco 2014: 10). For pictorial
representation, the significance of resemblance is challenged by Greenberg (2013),
crediting instead the view of depiction as geometrical transformation (e.g., Hagen
1986). Transformations of representations, pictorial and otherwise, lead to “the
mystery of deduction” (Shin 2015) for sufficiently complex transformations of
representations of the premise to representations of the conclusion. That complexity
is minimised in “an absolutely transparent representation” where “we could read off
all of the logically implied conclusions from the given information”
With a transparent representation, we may see that the conclusion-
representation is a (physical or literal) part of the premise-representation
without any manipulation, or, if transformations are needed, then
finding a pathway from one representation to another representation
is trivial or mechanical. (Shin 2015: 51-52)
A conclusion that is “part of” a premise can be drawn from eliminating an occurrence
of the binary connective ∧ representing and.
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Conjunction elimination lies behind the representation of events in Davidson (1967),
about which, more later. For now, consider the question
(Q2) Can pictures and logical formulas combine in a system of transparent repre-
sentations?
Automating translations between pictures and language is a challenging task; it
would be no mean feat to demonstrate (Q2) can be answered affirmatively for a non-
trivial range of pictures and logical formulas (and a useful notion of transparency).
The present paper provides no such demonstration, leaving the effortlessness with
which humans routinely mix pictures and language a mystery. Short of explaining
that mystery away, we focus more modestly on how logical formulas might serve as
stepping stones for understanding time in pictorial narratives. In particular, logical
formulas are applied to make sense of the strings (D), (N) and (I) of boxes above.
1.2 Strings and the big picture
The formulas are constructed from a finite set A, each element a ∈ A of which labels
a distinct unary predicate symbol Pa. It is natural to construe a string s= α1 · · ·αn of
subsets αi of A as interpreting each Pa as a subset [[Pa]] of the set
[n] := {1,2, . . . ,n}
of integers from 1 to n, namely, the set
[[Pa]] := {i ∈ [n] | a ∈ αi}
of string positions at which a occurs in s. For example, the string a a,b b
interprets Pa as [[Pa]] = {1,3} and Pb as [[Pb]] = {3,4}. Let 2A be the power set of A
(i.e., the set of subsets of A), and let us call a string over the alphabet 2A an A-string.
An A-string α1 · · ·αn can be reconstructed from n and the subsets [[Pa]] of [n] indexed
by A through the equations
αi = {a ∈ A | i ∈ [[Pa]]} for all i ∈ [n].
To describe strings in predicate logic, it is customary to introduce a binary rela-
tion symbol S (for successor), and repackage an A-string α1 · · ·αn as an A-model
〈[n],Sn, [[Pa]]a∈A〉 with universe/domain/carrier set [n], interpreting Pa as the subset
[[Pa]] of [n] (for each a ∈ A) and S as the +1 relation
Sn := {(1,2), . . . ,(n−1,n)} = {(i, i+1) | i ∈ [n−1]}
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on [n]. For instance, S4 = {(1,2),(2,3),(3,4)}.
It is tempting to describe an A-string α1 · · ·αn as n successive snapshots, starting
with α1, followed by α2, . . . ending with αn. But let us resist confusing a box αi
with a picture pi, not to mention the sequence α1 · · ·αn with a pictorial narrative
p1 · · · pn. In (D), (N) and (I) above, a picture p is treated as an element of A that may
go into a box α . Under the aforementioned projective conception of p as the output
of a function pi that is fed a scene σ and a viewpoint v
p = pi(σ ,v),
a box α represents some σ for which
’p ∈ α’ suggests p= pi(σ ,v) for some viewpoint v.
To make this suggestion precise for a fixed function pi , let us represent σ as the set
σpi := {(p,v) | pi(σ ,v) = p}∪{p | pi(σ ,v) = p for some v}
which, given any finite sets P and V of pictures and viewpoints respectively, we can
turn into a finite set by intersection
σpi [P,V ] := σpi ∩ (P∪ (P×V )).
Applying the transformation λσ .σpi [P,V ] componentwise to a string σ1 · · ·σn of
scenes yields the (P∪ (P×V ))-string
α1 · · ·αn where αi := σpii [P,V ]




P(p,v)(x)) (biconditional ≡, disjunction
∨
)(1)
saying p occurs at and only at string positions where (p,v) does for some v ∈V .1
The sets σpi [P,V ] depend on not just P andV but also the projection pi , incorporating
1 Just as the proposition expressed by the sentence
you are hungry
varies with the addressee and utterance time, the particular object depicted by a picture p (of say, an
empty cup) varies with pi,σ and v as we may have
pi(σ ,v) = p= pi ′(σ ′,v′) even though pi 6= pi ′ or σ 6= σ ′ or v 6= v′.
Pairing p with v sharpens the predicate Pp to P(p,v), as asserted by (1). More on (1) in §§2.2-3 below.
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parameter settings suppressed in the notation pi(σ ,v). Deviating from any choice of
pi allows for artistic license, taken, for instance, by a painting p that blends various
times. But literal meaning has always come ahead of figurative meaning in formal
semantics, so should artistic license not wait? Positions differ . . .
Be that as it may, we will not dwell on the choice of pi below, focusing rather
on the temporal relations between pictures in a narrative. Kamp (2013) expresses
a guiding intuition about natural language that arguably applies to a narrative with
pictures in place of sentences
when we interpret a piece of discourse — or a single sentence in
the context in which it is being used — we build something like a
model of the episode or situation described; and an important part of
that model are its event structure, and the time structure that can be
derived from that event structure (Kamp 2013: 13).
That event structure consists, in practice, of finitely many events (roughly, those
mentioned in the discourse), marking out a finite set of temporal stretches (far coarser
than the real line R, often used for time). This temporal structure is formulated
below using strings such as (D), (N) and (I) above, on the understanding that boxes
are arranged in chronological order. An assumption essential for the discreteness
of time (justifying talk of the next or previous temporal stretch) is the requirement
that the set A of labels a of predicates Pa be finite (explaining the intersection of σpi
above with the finite set P∪ (P×V ) of labels). Having bounded the granularity by
requiring A be finite, we can coarsen the granularity by reducing A to some subset
of it, or refine that granularity by moving to a larger finite set A′ of labels. This
enlargement can be carried out in any number of ways, not limited to adding more
pictures p or viewpoints v (outside P or V , respectively) for labels p and (p,v). For
instance, we might represent the pixelmap associated with a picture p as a finite set
of labels c(z) classifying a region z of space as c. Or a label (p,z,x) might annotate
a picture p with a discourse referent x for an entity depicted in some region z of p
to facilitate co-reference across pictures (Abusch 2013). Or a label see(z, p) might
specify the picture p an agent z sees, as in free perception hidden operators (Abusch
& Rooth 2017). Just as there is no limit to unary predicate symbols that one can
dream up, so too is there no limit to labels, which we can collect in some large
infinite set Θ. The idea then is to form A-strings, where A is a finite subset of Θ.
The set Fin(Θ) of finite subsets of Θ serves as the basis of a projective system of
variable temporal granularity (Fernando 2016, 2019), reviewed below.
With respect to the discussion of the strings (D), (N) and (I) above, we draw on
insights from event semantics to develop the following claims in section 2.
(a) The derivation of (N) from (D) above rests on the absence of forces at play
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— an assumption unwarranted in cases of change (for progression), but
appropriate for portraying a static background.
(b) Forces are suggested, if not depicted outright, in a picture or a succession of
pictures.
(c) Inertia is not all-or-nothing (nor is a picture, in general, wholly stative or
wholly non-stative): some pieces of a picture may persist, others may not.
(d) Breaking a picture p up into a finite set α of predicates facilitates a separation
of stative pieces from non-stative ones expressing forces.
Eyeing transparent representations, we proceed in section 3 to flesh out
(e) Granularity can be varied via projections that recognize gaps between boxes
and the difference between statives and non-statives (with non-stative pieces
from p1 or p2, if they exist, blocking the passage from (D) to (N)).
We make a nod at the end to other mechanisms that override the default reading (D),
deploying representations that go beyond A-strings (e.g., Asher & Lascarides 2003;
Cooper & Ginzburg 2015).
2 A picture as a thousand words: stative and non-stative pieces
How are we to turn a pictorial narrative p1 · · · pn of pictures into a sequence α1 · · ·αk
of boxes representing what the narrative is about? We can start by breaking a picture
p into pieces, which we then put in a box α — any two pieces composing con-
junctively to describe p (and decomposing by conjunction elimination). Pixelmaps
provide familiar examples, with which we may take liberties, replacing low-level
information such as black(201,93) with more abstract descriptions such as smiling-
Pat. Bringing other pictures p′ into the mix complicates matters with questions
about time and change. On the question of the aspectual type of pictures and its
ramifications for temporal progression, Abusch claims
Some examples suggest that pictures can have stative aspect and that
such pictures do not advance time, paralleling the situation in natural
language. However, we show on the basis of formal semantics that
all pictures have stative informational content, so that a construction
rule for pictorial discourse representations cannot be sensitive to
aspect. This suggests that the temporal interpretation rule for pictorial
narratives involves invariant temporal progression. (Abusch 2014:
9).
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This claim is re-examined in this section, with pictures broken into pieces collected
in A, and pictorial narratives interpreted in terms of A-strings that represent time in
accordance with the Aristotelian dictum
(Ntc) no time without change
and the principle of inertia
(Inr) no change without force.
Recall that (Ntc) and (Inr) figure in the discussion of (D), (N) and (I) in the Intro-
duction; very roughly, (Inr) takes us from (D) to (I), while (Ntc) takes us from (I) to
(N). Our aim now is to make this rough account rigorous.
2.1 Statives and strings
Statives are central to Dowty’s well-known hypothesis that
the different aspectual properties of the various kinds of verbs can
be explained by postulating a single homogeneous class of predi-
cates – stative predicates – plus three or four sentential operators or
connectives (Dowty 1979: 71)
Insofar as Dowty’s aspectual calculus or related temporal representations are built
from statives, it is not surprising that “all pictures have stative information content.”
But of course, Abusch (2014) has more in mind than the mere presence of statives in
these representations. A predicate P on intervals is homogeneous if P holds of an
interval I precisely if for every element t of I, P holds of the interval {t}
P(I) ⇐⇒ (∀t ∈ I) P({t}).
Homogeneous predicates carry certain entailments, such (2) and (3).
(2) Pat slept from 11pm to 7am =⇒ Pat slept from midnight to 3am
(3) Pat slept from 11pm to 3am and from 2am to 7am =⇒ Pat slept from 11pm
to 7am
Let us call a predicate P on intervals segmented if for all intervals I and I′ whose
union I∪ I′ is an interval, P holds of I∪ I′ iff it holds of each of I and I′
P(I∪ I′) ⇐⇒ P(I) and P(I′) whenever I∪ I′ is an interval.
The direction =⇒ makes P divisive (as illustrated by (2)), while its converse,⇐=,
makes P cumulative (as illustrated by (3)). Clearly, any homgeneous predicate P
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is segmented. Conversely, a segmented predicate P is homogeneous provided the
linear order ≺ underlying the intervals is a subset of U×U for some finite set U . In
the case of an A-string α1 · · ·αn, repackaged as the A-model 〈[n],Sn, [[Pa]]a∈A〉, we
can let
(a) U be the set [n] of string positions 1, . . . ,n
(b) ≺ be the transitive closure of Sn
(c) each a ∈ A name the homogeneous predicate Pa on intervals of [n] such that
Pa(I) ⇐⇒ (∀t ∈ I) t ∈ [[Pa]]
for all intervals I of [n].
When convenient, we conflate a name a ∈ A with the subset [[Pa]] of [n], and refer to
A as a set of subsets p of U .2
Given an interval I (such as U) and a set A of subsets p of I, is there an A-string
that depicts the predicates in A over I, surveyed in increasing (chronological) order?
To make this question precise, let us say




Ii and (∀i ∈ [n−1])(∀t ∈ Ii)(∀t ′ ∈ Ii+1) t ≺ t ′
(in words: a segmentation of I is a finite ordered partition of I)
(b) an A-depiction of I is an A-string α1 · · ·αn such that for some segmentation
I1 · · · In of I and every p ∈ A, i ∈ [n], and t ∈ αi,
p ∈ αi ⇐⇒ t ∈ p
(making α1 · · ·αn a filmstrip of A over I).
To illustrate, if I is the closed unit interval [0,1] = {t ∈ R | 0≤ t ≤ 1} (over the real
line R) and p is the open unit interval (0,1) = {t ∈ R | 0 < t < 1}, then p is a
{p}-depiction of I, as is any string from the infinite set
p + = { p , p p , p p p , . . .}.
2 Caution: the letter p is written in different fonts to distinguish its various uses as a picture p, a
predicate/subset P or p, and a predicate symbol Pa. While a predicate symbol can often be conflated
with a predicate for simplicity (rebelling against logical pedantry), confusing a picture with either is
somewhat more perilous.
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To formulate a useful necessary condition for the existence of an A-depiction of I,
let us define for any p ∈ A, a p-alternation in I to be a string t1 · · · tn of elements of I
such that for all i ∈ [n−1], ti ≺ ti+1 and
ti ∈ p ⇐⇒ ti+1 6∈ p
(in words: a p-alternation is an increasing sequence of points in I that alternate
between being in and out of p). Now, given any A-depiction α1 · · ·αn of I, its length
n is an upper bound on the length of any p-alternation in I. Let us say a subset p of I
is I-stable if there is an integer k such that for every p-alternation t1 · · · tn in I, n< k
(bounding the length of any p-alternation in I by k). I-stability is not just necessary
for an A-depiction of I but sufficient.
Depiction theorem (Fernando 2016) Given an interval I and a finite set A of
subsets p of I, there is an A-depiction of I iff every p in A is I-stable.
A special case of the depiction theorem is where every p-alternation t1 · · · tn in I has
length n≤ 1 (for every p ∈ A) so that the subset
{p ∈ A | I∩p 6= /0}
of A (which we have been drawing as a box, and can be understood as a string of
length 1) is an A-depiction of I. A somewhat more interesting case is where I is
a finite set {t1, . . . , tn} with t1 ≺ ·· · ≺ tn, which we can turn into an A-depiction
α1 · · ·αn of I with
αi := {p ∈ A | ti ∈ p} for each i ∈ [n]
albeit longer than necessary if say, α1 = α2. (Note that the depiction theorem does
not assume I is finite.)
To pick out A-depictions uniquely, we compress strings as folows. A string
α1 · · ·αn is stutterless if for all i ∈ [n−1], αi 6= αi+1. For any string s = α1 · · ·αn,
its block compression bc(s) deletes every αi such that αi = αi+1
bc(α1 · · ·αn) :=

α1 · · ·αn if n< 2
bc(α2 · · ·αn) if α1 = α2
α1 bc(α2 · · ·αn) otherwise.
Clearly, bc(s) is stutterless, and
s is stutterless ⇐⇒ bc(s) = s.
Furthermore, for any A-depiction s of I, bc(s) is an A-depiction of I that is shorter




Dowty Fillmore Levin & Rappaport Hovav
BECOME break result (stative a) a a
DO hit manner (force f ) ap( f ) ef( f )
Table 1 Changes from Becoming to Doing
(Ntc)A no time without changeA
with change evaluated up to granularity A.
2.2 From depicting to classifying change
A rudimentary aspectual distinction widely recognized to be significant in tempo-
rality is that between statives and eventives (e.g., Kamp & Reyle 1993). If a set A
consist of labels of stative predicates, an eventive is a predicate expressing change
that can be represented up to granularity A by an A-string. The simplest instances
of change are formulated in Dowty (1979) through connectives DO and BECOME,
that are associated in Table 1 with Levin & Rappaport Hovav (2013)’s manner/result
complementarity, which, in turn, generalizes the contrast between the verbs break
and hit pointed out in Fillmore (1970). The fourth column of Table 1 effectively
analyses BECOME as a function that maps a label a to a string a a
BECOMEs := λa. a a
where a labels a predicate Pa that negates the predicate Pa labeled by a
∀x (Pa(x)≡ ¬Pa(x)).(4)





from §1.2, belongs to the system MSOA of Monadic Second-Order Logic over
strings with a set A of labels of unary predicates (e.g., Libkin 2004). As previously
mentioned, the set A varies over the set Fin(Θ) of finite subsets of some large
(infinite) set Θ, assumed for present purposes to include labels ap( f ) and ef( f ) for
the application and ef fects of certain forces f . The idea is that manners and results in
Levin & Rappaport Hovav (2013) are represented as forces and statives, respectively,
with forces f fed to the operator
DOs := λ f . ap( f ) ef( f )
52
Pictorial narratives and temporal refinement
atomic extended
ACHIEVEMENT ACCOMPLISHMENT
+conseq culmination culminated process
STATIVE a a a a,ap( f ) a,ap( f ),ef( f ) ef( f ),a
(semelfactive) ACTIVITY
−conseq point process
f ap( f ) ef( f ) ap( f ) ap( f ),ef( f ) ef( f )
Table 2 Moens & Steedman (1988)’s reconstruction of ARKV with strings
just as statives a are fed to BECOMEs. The obvious question is:
what do ap( f ), ef( f ) mean and what are we to make of the sortal
difference between statives a and forces f ?
Answering this question will take up most of the remainder of this section (and some
of the next).
Part of the answer can be gleaned from the Aristotle-Ryle-Kenny-Vendler verb
classification (Dowty 1979), reworked in Table 2 according to Moens & Steedman
(1988). Notice that the fourth column of Table 1 appears under the feature atomic
in Table 2, to the left of the (contrary) feature extended. Whereas a is precluded from
occuring in a box where a occurs (by (4), the labels ap( f ) and ef( f ) occur together
in the second box under the extended column. To understand what ap( f ) and ef( f )
might mean, it is instructive to ask: where is the force that, under the principle (Inr)
of inertia, effects the change from a to a depicted by a a ? That force certainly
does not appear in BECOMEs(a) — at least not explicitly.
We can pick out string positions x where a does not occur but is succeeded by a
position where a occurs, using the MSO{a}-formula χl(a)(x)
χl(a)(x) := ∃y(xSy∧Pa(y))∧¬Pa(x)
a occurs at the position next to x but not at x
(making l(a) a left border of a). To illustrate, if the positions of a string s= α1 · · ·αn
picked out by χl(a)(x) are put in
pl(a) := {i ∈ [n] | s |= χl(a)[x/i]}
= {i ∈ [n−1] | a ∈ αi+1−αi}
then for s= a′ a a,a′ a′ a (with n= 5),
pl(a) = {1,4} and pl(a′) = {2}.
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For each a∈ A, we can treat l(a) as a label inΘ that we can introduce into an A-string
α1 · · ·αn by expanding it to the (A∪{l(a)|a ∈ A})-string β1 · · ·βn−1αn where
βi := αi∪{l(a) | a ∈ αi+1−αi} for i ∈ [n−1].
For example, a′ a a,a′ a′ a expands to a′, l(a) a, l(a′) a,a′ l(a),a′ a . To
emphasize what BECOME and DO have in common, let us modify BECOMEs to
BECOME′s := λa. l(a) a
(compare to DOs := λ f . ap( f ) ef( f ) )
making l(a) the BECOME-analog of ap( f ), and a the BECOME-analog of ef( f ).
Or zeroing in on the labels, we can reformulate BECOMEs and DOs as operators
BECOME := λa.l(a) DO := λ f .ap( f )
that return labels (in Θ). The label l(a) expresses change (formulated in χl(a)(x))
which neither a nor a does. (Note that the constraint (4) introducing a has no use
for the successor relation symbol S.) What change ap( f ) expresses, we leave for the
next subsection.
In the meantime, let us pause to systematise the expansions of A considered
above, paying particular attention to their order independence. For b 6∈ A and an
MSOA-formula χb(a), let cbA : (2
A)∗ → (2A∪{b})∗ be the function mapping an A-
string α1 · · ·αn to the (A∪{b})-string
β1 · · ·βn where βi := αi∪{b | α1 · · ·αn |= χb[x/i]} for i ∈ [n].
For example, if b= a and χa(x) is ¬Pa(x) then
ca{a}( a ) = a a
and if b= l(a) then for the previously defined MSO{a}-formula χl(a)(x),
cl(a){a} ( a ) = l(a) a .










for any A-string s. In fact, rather than adding a label one at a time to A, we might do
so in one go. Given a set B disjoint from A and an MSOA-formula χb(x) for each
b ∈ B, let eBA : (2A)∗→ (2A∪B)∗ map an A-string α1 · · ·αn to the (A∪B)-string
β1 · · ·βn where βi :=αi∪{b ∈ B | α1 · · ·αn |= χb[x/i]} for i ∈ [n].
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let us invert the function eBA, defining the A-reduct ρA(s) of any string s of sets (which
need not be a subset of A) to be the componentwise intersection of s with A
ρA(α1 · · ·αn) := (α1∩A) · · ·(αn∩A).
For example,
ρ{a}( l(a) a ) = a
and for any A-string s, ρA(s) = s and
ρA(eBA(s)) = s for B∩A= /0.
Fact Let A and B be disjoint sets, and each b ∈ B label an MSOA-formula χb(x).
Then for any (A∪B)-string s, s= eBA(ρA(s)) iff for every b ∈ B, s satisfies
∀x (Pb(x)≡ χb(x)).(5)
Explicit definitions (5) include (1) and (4) and the instance given by b= l(a) above.
The fact follows from a fundamental property of reducts
(†) for all sets A and A′ such that A⊆ A′, for every MSOA-sentence ϕ and every
A′-string s,
s |= ϕ ⇐⇒ ρA(s) |= ϕ .
(†) is an instance of the satisfaction condition in Goguen & Burstall (1992) charac-
teristic of an institution, a logical system varying A smoothly. More below.
2.3 Open-ended refinements and lexicalized meaning
Returning to our initial example of picture p labeling a predicate Pp defined through






tying the set V (p) of viewpoints v to p, as different pictures may involve dif-
ferent viewpoints, and V (p) had better be finite for the disjunction to fall within
MSO{p}×V (p). Notice that v (as well as p) can be construed as a discourse referent
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subject to different interpretations. Hence, we are free to throw into V (p) a wildcard
? for an otherwise clause P(?,p)(x) completing the disjunction (and securing the
biconditional ≡). The idea is that ? represents the limits of our knowledge, our
ignorance, the unknown. Alternatively, we might break the biconditional (1) into the
conditionals
∀x (P(p,v)(x)⊃ Pp(x))
for each v ∈V (without requiring ? ∈V ).
We move now from viewpoints behind pictures to forces f behind change (on
which time depends according to (Ntc)). Let us write ap f for the unary predicate
symbol Paˆ where aˆ is ap( f ) (saying f is applied), and ef f for Paˆ where aˆ is ef( f )
(saying the effects of f hold) . Next, given a label a for a stative predicate symbol





for a suitable finite set F(a) of forces f for a (with perhaps a as ef( f ), and, if
necessary, a wildcard ?a in F(a))? Not so fast. There is more to l(a) than applying a
force; a is also understood to hold following some such application, as spelled out in
χl(a)(x) := ∃y(xSy∧Pa(y))∧¬Pa(x)
from the previous subsection. The problem is that other forces applied at the same
time as f can interfere with ef( f ). In the absence of such interference, we may step
from ap( f ) to ef( f ), as expressed in the implication
∀x∀y (xSy∧ ap f (x)∧¬opposed f (x) ⊃ ef f (y))(7)
where opposed f (x) is a formula saying some force opposing f is applied at x
opposed f (x) :=
∨
f ′∈O( f )
ap f ′(x)
for some finite set O( f ) of f -opposing forces f ′ that clash with f in that
¬∃x (ef f (x)∧ ef f ′(x))
(and, if necessary, a wildcard ? f ∈ O( f ) to keep the set finite). This is not to say
that ¬opposed f (x) is necessary to conclude ef f (y) from xSy∧ ap f (x); only that
opposed f (x) requires further assumptions to draw that conclusion. While (6) is
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of inertia, no change l(a) without some force from F(a).
Whereas the predicates Pa and Pl(a) labeled in
BECOMEs = λa. a a and BECOME = λa.l(a)
are defined by Pa through instances of (5) given by b= a, l(a), there is no predicate
Pf that defines the predicates ap f and ef f labeled in
DOs = λ f . ap( f ) ef( f ) and DO = λ f .ap( f ).
Instead, the constraints (7) and (8) on ap f and ef f depend on sets O( f ) and F(a)
that vary with the circumstances of the utterance. Returning to Table 1, we might
say, echoing Levin & Rappaport Hovav (2013), that
(a) a result (break/BECOME) verb lexically prescribes its post-condition a (as
well as its pre-condition a), while its manner is supplied by context of use
(b) a manner (hit/DO) verb lexically prescribes the manner f , leaving context to
make what it will of ef f , ap f .3
The division of labour in meaning between the lexicon and context of use carries
over to a picture p; its “lexicalized meaning” Pp decouples p as an artifact from
the viewpoint v and the other circumstances of its creation/use (recall footnote 1
in the introduction). We can sharpen the predicate Pp to some predicate P(p,v) or
P(p,~z) incorporating the circumstances~z of projection (which need not be in some
objective world, but rather in the mind of an agent z, as in the second picture of a
free perception pair in Abusch & Rooth (2017)). There is no limit to the labels we
may put into the infinite set Θ, a finite subset of which is chosen for A. This paper’s
focus has not been on any projection (which reduces the alphabet 2A of an A-string),
but rather on temporal constraints between different boxes in an A-string, expressed
in χl(a) and (7), (8) through the successor relation S holding a string together.
3 String iconicity: projections, parts and limitations
For string iconicity, it is helpful to construe a string two ways, as
(a) a semantic entity/model, and
(b) a syntactic expression/representation.
3 That post-condition, pre-condition pair may well describe an incremental change over some scale,
expanding A so that ap( f ) and ef( f ) may occur together in a box, as in the extended column of Table




stative holds (be) static still (snapshot) state
eventive happens (do/become) dynamic movie (motion pic) transition
Table 3 Statives vs eventives pictured
For example, a regular expression e over an alphabet Σ denotes a setL (e)⊆ Σ∗ of
strings over Σ, with
L (s) = {s} for any s ∈ Σ∗.(9)
If a string s = σ1 · · ·σn ∈ Σ∗ is identified with the MSOΣ-model 〈[n],Sn, [Pσ ]σ∈Σ〉
that interprets Pσ as [Pσ ] := {i ∈ [n] | σ = σi} then a theorem due to Büchi, Elgot
and Trakhtenbrot (BET) states that there is an MSOΣ-sentence ϕ such that
L (e) = {s ∈ Σ∗ | s |= ϕ}(10)
and conversely, for any MSOΣ-sentence ϕ , (10) holds for some regular expression e
(e.g., Libkin 2004: 124). (That is, BET says MSOΣ-sentences pick out exactly the
regular languages over Σ.) The degree of resemblance, if any, between an MSO-
sentence ϕ and a string that satisfies ϕ contrasts starkly with (9). The aim of this
section is to extend (9) to further iconic representations, where the form-meaning
resemblance is spelled out by projections and mereological relations on strings. To
define these functions and parts, we work with A-strings α1 · · ·αn (over the alphabet
Σ= 2A), understood as MSOA-models 〈[n],Sn, [[Pa]]a∈A〉, rather than MSO2A-models
〈[n],Sn, [Pσ ]σ⊆A〉. As in the previous section, an element a of A may label a stative
predicate Pa that holds of a stretch of time, or, in the case of l(a), a non-stative
predicate Pl(a) that happens just before the succeeding stretch, described as eventive
in Table 3. The stative/eventive distinction is reflected in the projections defined
below.
3.1 Projections from reducts and compressing two ways
Just as any set Θ is the union of the set Fin(Θ) of its finite subsets, any linear
order < on Θ can be constructed from its finite chains a1 < · · · < an, which for
A = {a1, . . . ,an}, we can formulate as the A-string a1 · · · an or <A for short. To
make this construction precise, we define for every finite subset A of Θ, the function
dA : (2Θ)∗→ (2A)∗ mapping a Θ-string s to the A-string dA(s) obtained from the
A-reduct of s by deleting all occurrences of the empty box; i.e., dA(s) is d(ρA(s)),
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eventives statives
d(s) := s without  bc(s) := s without stutters
ss′  ss′ (non-abutting) sααs′  sαs′ (abutting)
Table 4 Compressing two ways (with abutment from cumulativity)
where d(ε) := ε and
d(αs) :=
{
d(s) if α =
α d(s) otherwise.
To illustrate, for Θ= R and A= {2,pi,1,7}, <A is 1 2 pi 7 and
dA(<A∪{5,−1}) = d(ρA( −1 1 2 pi 5 7 )) = d( 1 2 pi 7 ) = <A .
Now, we can describe < as the inverse limit of the A-strings <A and functions dA,
noting that {dA}A∈Fin(Θ) is a projective system in that for any A ∈ Fin(Θ),
(a) dA(s) = s for any A-string s, and
(b) dB(s) = dB(dA(s)) for any B⊆ A and any Θ-string s.
Next, we consider how these projections dA relate to the depictions and expan-
sions from the previous section, where in place of d, we have block compression
bc for the abutment required by interval segementations (§2.1); see Table 4. These
two ways to compress can be related by pairing the left border l(a) with the right
border r(a)
χr(a)(x) := Pa(x)∧¬∃y(xSy∧Pa(y))
a occurs at x but not at any following position
and defining the border translation bA(s) of an A-string s to be ρB(eBA(s)) where B
is the set
A• := {l(a) | a ∈ A}∪{r(a) | a ∈ A}
of borders of A (with χl(a) making a true, and χr(a) stopping a from being true). For
instance,
b{a,a′}( a a,a′ ) = ρB( l(a) a, l(a′) a,a′,r(a),r(a′) ) where B is {a,a′}•
= l(a) l(a′) r(a),r(a′) .
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Looking through bA, we see that bc and d are opposite sides of the same coin
bA(bc(s)) = d(bA(s)) for any A-string s that does not end in .
Projection with respect to A takes the A-reduct before compressing
fA(s) := f (ρA(s)) for any string s of sets
where f = bc if A labels statives, and f = d if A labels eventives. A-projections fA
provide interesting examples of Goguen & Burstall (1992)’s institutions, courtesy of
the biconditional
s ∈ fA−1L ⇐⇒ fA(s) ∈ L(11)
for any Θ-string s and set L of A-strings. If the string s in (11) is understood as a
model, and the language L is the denotation set [[ϕ]] ⊆ (2A)∗ of an expression ϕ ,
then (11) becomes the satisfaction condition
s |= 〈 fA〉ϕ ⇐⇒ fA(s) |= ϕ(12)
where 〈 fA〉 is the modal operator with accessibility relation fa. In case [[ϕ]] is a
singleton set {s′}, the right side of (12) reduces to the equation fA(s) = s′.
3.2 Parts and partiality
As fA is a function, the modal operator 〈 fA〉 in (12) can be read existentially as a
diamond or universally as a square. The difference takes on significance when fA is
weakened to a mereological relation such as subsumption D, a form of conjunction
elimination for strings
α1 · · ·αnDα ′1 · · ·α ′m ⇐⇒ n= m and α ′i ⊆ α1 for all i ∈ [n]
non-deterministically generalizing reducts
sDρA(s) for all A and strings s of sets.
D is useful for variable-free (iconic?) formulations of constraints such as inertia (8)
a a ⇒ ap(Fa)
via an implication operator⇒ on string sets (e.g., Fernando 2008: 329-332).
Beyond A-strings and the semantic timelines they represent, there are more
elaborate structures that move into pragmatic territory, notably (a) record types
encoding interaction centered around questions under discussion (e.g., Cooper &
Ginzburg 2015), and (b) Segmented Discourse Representation Structures supporting
deviations from temporal succession based on maximizing discourse coherence (e.g.,
Asher & Lascarides 2003). Implicit in the attention paid to A-strings and finite-state
methods above is the challenge of doing a bit with less (and understanding what that
is and can be). This is not to deny the need for more to do more.
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